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Abstract
Background: Poor medical care and high fees are two major problems in the world health care system. As a result,
health care insurance system reform is a major issue in developing countries, such as China. Governments should
take the effect of health care insurance system reform on the competition of hospitals into account when they practice
a reform. This article aims to capture the influences of asymmetric medical insurance subsidy and the importance of
medical quality to patients on hospitals competition under non-price regulation.
Methods: We establish a three-stage duopoly model with quantity and quality competition. In the model, qualitative
difference and asymmetric medical insurance subsidy among hospitals are considered. The government decides subsidy
(or reimbursement) ratios in the first stage. Hospitals choose the quality in the second stage and then support the
quantity in the third stage. We obtain our conclusions by mathematical model analyses and all the results are achieved
by backward induction.
Results: The importance of medical quality to patients has stronger influence on the small hospital, while subsidy has
greater effect on the large hospital. Meanwhile, the importance of medical quality to patients strengthens competition,
but subsidy effect weakens it. Besides, subsidy ratios difference affects the relationship between subsidy and hospital
competition. Furthermore, we capture the optimal reimbursement ratio based on social welfare maximization. More
importantly, this paper finds that the higher management efficiency of the medical insurance investment funds is, the
higher the best subsidy ratio is.
Conclusions: This paper states that subsidy is a two-edged sword. On one hand, subsidy stimulates medical demand. On
the other hand, subsidy raises price and inhibits hospital competition. Therefore, government must set an appropriate
subsidy ratio difference between large and small hospitals to maximize the total social welfare. For a developing country
with limited medical resources and great difference in hospitals such as China, adjusting the reimbursement
ratios between different level hospitals and increasing medical quality are two reasonable methods for the
sustainable development of its health system.
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Background
Subsidized health insurance programs are often employed
by developing countries to provide basic health care to
their poor and uninsured citizens. In China, the basic med-
ical insurance is constituted by three groups, the Medical
Insurance for Urban Workers, the Urban Resident Basic
Medical Insurance, and the New Rural Cooperative Med-
ical. Those three types of insurance are supported with
different levels of medical subsidies and people can only
choose one of those three. Meanwhile, patients obtain
diverse medical subsidies when they go to different grade
hospitals. Health insurance subsidy accounts for a vast ma-
jority of expenditures of the government’s investment in
the medical industry. However, poor access and high fees
are still the two major problems in China’s health system.
Medical quality and medical subsidy are two important
factors influencing health seeking behavior of patients.
We define medical quality as cure ability and service
level of the hospital and medical quantity as the number
of patients a hospital treats in this study. Both medical
quality and subsidy influence health-seeking behavior of
patients. Medical quality has positive influence on pa-
tients because higher cure ability means the patient has
higher probability to be cured and higher service level
represents that patients have higher satisfaction. Medical
subsidy signifies that the government will pay part of the
expenditures of patients if they go to see the doctor.
Many countries reimburse patients with some fixed
amount. For example, for a hip replacement operation,
the hospital will get 1000 USD. But under the current
medical insurance policy, the Chinese government
chooses to reimburse the patient with a certain ratio of
his or her expenditures. Based on this medical insurance
policy, the hospital will receive a proportional expendi-
tures result in an operation or medical treatment, while
the patient only needs to pay the residuary. Medical sub-
sidy aims to reduce expenditures of the patient, so it also
has positive impact on the willingness of the patient to
go to a hospital when he or she is sick. Although the
major purpose of medical subsidy is to reduce the costs
of patients, it raises the price of health care, too.
Whether the real cost of the patient is actually reduced
is a question to be studied.
Based on these factors above, this study aims to capture
the optimal medical subsidy policy to improve patient’s
health level by employing a duopoly competition model.
Two hospitals, a larger hospital and a smaller one com-
pete in the health industry.1 We further assume medical
quality of the larger is higher than that of the smaller
one.2 Different subsidy policy implies different subsidy ra-
tios in this study. We try to answer the following ques-
tions in this paper: what are the effects of medical
insurance subsidy and medical quality on hospital compe-
tition? What is the optimal subsidy policy? How does the
management efficiency of medical insurance funds impact
the optimal subsidy ratio? The results of this study are
helpful for the government of China to practice suitable
health insurance policy.
Literature review
Quality competition is a major non-price competition in
industrial organization [1]. Quite a lot of prior research is
focused on quality competition from many different per-
spectives. Ye and Mukhopadhyay [2] investigated quality
competition from a demand side strategy perspective based
on a duopoly model. Their study illustrated that different
quality firms have different competition strategies and low
quality firms prefer demand side strategy. Blair and Dur-
rance [3] investigated the economics of collusion on quality
under constraints. They showed associated effects of collu-
sive behavior on consumer welfare. Cellini and Lamantia
[4] studied the effects of minimum quality standards on
quality competition under duopoly market model. Auray,
Mariotti and Moizeau [5], Wang, Chen and He [6]
highlighted quality regulation.
Some other studies pay much attention to hospitals be-
cause quality is quite critical in this industry. Berta et al. [7]
captured the effect of imperfect quality information on
hospital competition of Italy. They highlighted the effect of
quality information on patients’ choice of hospitals.
Somayeh, Hossein and Michael [8] also studied quality
competition and they showed that patients prefer to choose
high quality hospitals. Palangkaraya and Yong [9] investi-
gated the effects of competition on hospital quality and they
issued that competition either has positive or negative im-
pacts on hospital quality, which is dependent on the meas-
ure of quality. Interestingly, Tay [10] declared that quality
difference is especially important in the hospital industry
and patients are not substitutes between different hospitals.
Although numerous studies involve quality competition,
few of them involve medical insurance reimbursement.
Besides quality competition, subsidy is widely used in
many other fields [11, 12]. The impacts of subsidy under
duopoly, however, are different in various sectors and fields.
For instance, R&D subsidy stimulates innovation invest-
ment effectively [13, 14], but investment subsidy may
crowd-out private expenditures in investment [15, 16].
Zheng Shi [17] showed that subsidy and service price may
have a negative relation with Mobile telecommunication.
But, Feng et al. [18] addressed that medical insurance sub-
sidy increases medical service price. Besides, Xiong et al.
[19] showed that it is an indispensable means of competi-
tion for the Internet enterprises to adopt subsidy policies.
But, it will affect the growth of its profits, when subsidy
policies are adopted improperly or employed without
being innovated. Some researchers also studied the rela-
tionship between subsidy and quality. Sauer et al. [20] in-
vestigated the effect of environmental subsidy on quality
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of surface waters. In comparison, this paper captures med-
ical insurance subsidy. But many studies focused on the
effect of medical insurance subsidy on health and medical
service utilization [21, 22]. However, there is little evidence
on the effects of medical subsidy on quality competition.
A novel innovation of this study is in combining medical
quality of hospitals and medical insurance subsidy. The
major contributions of this paper are outlined as follows.
First, the importance of quality to patients strengthens
competition among hospitals, while medical subsidy
weakens it. Second, reimbursement ratio difference be-
tween small and large hospitals affects the impact of
subsidy on competition. Third, we capture the optimal re-
imbursement ratio based on the maximization of social
welfare. Meanwhile, the higher management efficiency the
medical insurance investment fund is, the higher the opti-
mal subsidy ratios are.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The model
under duopoly is established in the next section. Here we
establish a three-stage duopoly model with quantity and
quality competition. The government decides the reim-
bursement ratio of medical expenses in the first stage.
Two hospitals choose the quality in the second stage and
then support the quantity in the third stage. The model
with Cournot is analyzed in Section 4. Then, some discus-
sions are presented in the final section.
Methods
Here, we establish a duopoly model by taking quantity
and quality competition with medical reimbursement
(subsidy) into account. Suppose there are two hospitals
denoted as i∈ {g,s} in the industry.3 Hospitals’ medical
qualities (cure ability and service level) are denoted by q
= (qg,qs), where subscript g represents the large (or high
quality) hospital, and s denotes the small (or low quality)
one. Hospitals’ reimbursement ratios for their treatment
and service from the government are τ = (τg,τs). Similarly,
the quantity vector is x = (xg,xs) and the medical care price
is p = (pg,ps). Then, the functions of the utility-maximizing
patients as well as the profit-maximizing hospitals are in-
troduced. In the following, we will outline the behaviors of
patients and hospitals, respectively.
Patients
The utility function of the representative patient is
presented as
U ¼ αþ βqg þ λτg
 








This utility function is similar to Ferrara & Missios [23],
Chen & Nie [24] and Chen & Nie [25], where the constant
α > 0, parameter β > 0,λ > 0. β and λ represent the import-
ance of quality and subsidy to patients, respectively.
Quality plays a critical role in hospital industry, so we
highlight the influence of the importance of quality to pa-
tients in this study. And γ ϵ [0,1] means the product sub-
stitutability. In general, the medical quality of a large
hospital is higher than that of small one (qg > qs) and sub-
sidy ratio of the large hospital is lower than that of the
small one (τg<τs). In other words, the larger hospital has a
quality advantage, while the smaller one has subsidy su-
periority. Based on utility maximization, the correspond-
ing inverse demand functions are:
pg ¼ αþ βqg−xg−γxs þ λτg ;
ps ¼ αþ βqs−xs−γxg þ λτs: ð2Þ
Here, we assume that prices are determined by the game
between hospitals and the government. From function (2),
quality and subsidy have positive influence on prices,
whereas both the quantity and outputs of the rivals nega-
tively relate to their prices. Based on functions (1) and (2),






Here, we model the two hospitals in this industry that
offer treatment and service with different quality levels
and they acquire different medical insurance funds from
the government.4
The objective functions of the two hospitals are:



















Notice that the vector (α + βqg − xg − γxs + λτg)xg in-
cludes medical insurance funds from the government,
while c xi; qið Þ ¼ 12 xi2 þ qi2ð Þ−xiqi is the cost function.
The timing of the game is: In the first stage, the gov-
ernment declares medical reimbursement ratios. Then,
the two hospitals commit to their medical quality level
in the second stage. In the third stage, according to the
quality levels, the hospitals decide the quantity of patient
treatments and medical services, whereas patients
choose the quantity of treatment and service. All solu-
tions are obtained by backward induction, which means
we will get the quantity of the last stage based on the
quality and subsidy, following the quality of the second
stage and then the subsidy ratio of the first stage.
Before model analysis, we make the following
assumption.
Assumption 1 < β < β and γ < γ≤1.
1 < β < β ensures both hospitals practice quality
innovation and qg > qs > 0, while γ < γ≤1 indicates that the
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products and services of the large hospital cannot com-
pletely replace those of the small one.5 In other words, the
two hospitals supply different treatments and services.
Results
Here, the model under Cournot competition is analyzed.
We attack the model using backward induction which
means the equilibrium of the third stage is first solved.
Then we address the second and the first stage.
In the third stage, by the first-order optimal conditions
of function (4), we obtain
∂πg
∂xg
¼ α−qg þ βqg−3xg−γxs þ λτg ¼ 0:
∂πs
∂xs
¼ α−qs þ βqs−3xs−γxg þ λτs ¼ 0: ð5Þ
Equation (5) indicates
α−qi þ βqi þ λτi ¼ 3xi þ γxj: ð6Þ
Therefore, we have
xg ¼
−3αþ αγ−3 −1þ βð Þqg þ −1þ βð Þγqs−3λτg þ γλτs
−9þ γ2 ;
xs ¼
−3αþ αγ−3 −1þ βð Þqs þ −1þ βð Þγqg−3λτs þ γλτg
−9þ γ2 :
ð7Þ
For the second stage, by substituting equation (7) into
function (4) and solving it, we get the equilibrium qual-
ity of the second stage.
Then we get the final equilibrium quantities by substi-
tuting equation (8) into function (7):
and equilibrium prices:
The optimal reimbursement ratios in the first stage will
be provided and analyzed in the social welfare analyses sec-
tion later. Next, we study effects of the reimbursement ra-
tios on the equilibrium quantity, price and quality of
hospitals.
Medical quality analyses
Denote Δx= xg − xs the quality difference and ΔxΣx the quan-
tity deviation, here Σx = xg + xs. Then from equation (9), we
have the following conclusions.




















































Remarks: First, the conclusions of Proposition 1 show
that the importance of medical quality to patients in-
creases medical quantity of the small hospital, but its
impact on the large hospital is uncertain. A suitable rea-
son is that the larger hospital already gets enough pa-
qg ¼ −
9 −1þ βð Þ α −18−18βþ 9β2 þ 9γ þ 3γ2−γ3 þ 3 −6−6βþ 3β2 þ γ2 λτg−γ −9þ γ2ð Þλτs 
324−324β3 þ 81β4−189γ2 þ 54β2γ2 þ 27γ4−γ6−108β −6þ γ2ð Þ ;
qs ¼ −
9 −1þ βð Þ α −18−18βþ 9β2 þ 9γ þ 3γ2−γ3 þ 3 −6−6βþ 3β2 þ γ2 λτs−γ −9þ γ2ð Þλτg 
324−324β3 þ 81β4−189γ2 þ 54β2γ2 þ 27γ4−γ6−108β −6þ γ2ð Þ :
ð8Þ
xg ¼
9−γ2ð Þ α 18þ 18β−9β2−9γ−3γ2 þ γ3 −3 −6−6βþ 3β2 þ γ2 λτg þ γ −9þ γ2ð Þλτs 
324−324β3 þ 81β4−189γ2 þ 54β2γ2 þ 27γ4−γ6−108β −6þ γ2ð Þ ;
xs ¼
9−γ2ð Þ α 18þ 18β−9β2−9γ−3γ2 þ γ3 −3 −6−6βþ 3β2 þ γ2 λτs þ γ −9þ γ2ð Þλτg 
324−324β3 þ 81β4−189γ2 þ 54β2γ2 þ 27γ4−γ6−108β −6þ γ2ð Þ :
ð9Þ
pg ¼ −
9þ 9β−2γ2ð Þ α −18−18βþ 9β2 þ 9γ þ 3γ2−γ3 þ 3 −6−6βþ 3β2 þ γ2 λτg−γ −9þ γ2ð Þλτs 
324−324β3 þ 81β4−189γ2 þ 54β2γ2 þ 27γ4−γ6−108β −6þ γ2ð Þ ;
ps ¼ −
9þ 9β−2γ2ð Þ α −18−18βþ 9β2 þ 9γ þ 3γ2−γ3 þ 3 −6−6βþ 3β2 þ γ2 λτs−γ −9þ γ2ð Þλτg 
324−324β3 þ 81β4−189γ2 þ 54β2γ2 þ 27γ4−γ6−108β −6þ γ2ð Þ :
ð10Þ
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tients, so the increase of the importance of medical qual-
ity to patients does not necessarily increase its patients.
However, the effects of the importance of medical qual-
ity to patients on the total quantity of the two hospitals
are positive. On the other hand, the effects of the im-
portance of medical quality to patients on the quantity
difference between the two hospitals are negative. It is
stated that the effects of the importance of medical qual-
ity to patients on the small hospital are greater than that
of the larger one. Meanwhile, we find the importance of
medical quality to patients decreases quantity deviation.
Those conclusions illustrate that the importance of med-
ical quality to patients increases the symmetry of hospi-
tals and enhances the competition as well.
Second, the subsidy effect or the importance of sub-
sidy to patients stimulates the large hospital’s quantity,
and also increases that of the small one only under the
situation that the subsidy ratio difference between the
two hospitals is small. Interestingly, the effect of subsidy
on the quantity of the small hospital is reversed if the
subsidy ratio difference is large enough, which means
that the subsidy effect will fail to release effective med-
ical needs if the subsidy ratio difference of two hospitals
is too large.
In addition, we discover that the subsidy effect increases
total demand. On the other hand, it expands quantity dif-
ference and quantity deviation between the large and small
hospitals, too. In other words, the conclusions of Propos-
ition 1 show that the effect of subsidy on the quantity of
the large hospital is greater than that of the small one. That
is why more and more patients in China prefer to choose
large hospitals under the current subsidy policy [26]. Thus,
the government needs to practice such policy that increases
the subsidy difference between large and small hospitals to
achieve a reasonable distribution of medical consumption.
Medical price analyses
Denote by Δp = pg − ps the price difference and
Δp
Σp the price
deviation, where Σp = pg + ps. From function (10), we
achieve the following conclusions.


















































Remarks: First, the conclusions of Proposition 2 show
that the importance of medical quality to patients in-
creases the prices of both hospitals, but reduces the
price difference and price deviation. This means the im-
portance of medical quality to patients strengthens the
market power of hospitals but enhances competition,
too.
Second, the subsidy effect increases the price of the
larger hospital, but it increases the small hospital’s price
only when the subsidy ratio difference is small. Interest-
ingly, the subsidy effect on the price of the small hospital
is reversed if the subsidy ratio difference is large enough
between the two hospitals. Moreover, the effect of sub-
sidy enlarges price difference and price deviation, which
illustrates that the price increase effect of subsidy on the
large hospital is larger than that on the small one. In
other word, the subsidy effect increases the asymmetry
between hospitals or makes hospital industry becoming
more asymmetric.
Combining Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, although
the subsidy effect stimulates medical purchase, it also
brings the patients with some negative effects, such as
making it more difficult to obtain medical service and
higher medical care price.
Medical quality analyses
Define Δq = qg − qs and
Δq
Σq the quality difference and de-
viation respectively, where Σq = qg + qs. Then by equation
(8), we have the following conclusions:
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Remarks: The conclusions of Proposition 3 show
that the importance of medical quality to patients in-
creases quality innovation of the small hospital, but
its effect on the quality innovation of the large hos-
pital is ambiguous. So the effect of the importance of
medical quality to patients on the total quality of the
two hospitals is also ambiguous. We know that the
large hospital has already owned higher quality, so
the importance of medical quality to patients does
not necessarily increase its quality innovation. Mean-
while, the importance of medical quality to patients
decreases quality differences and quality deviation.
Those conclusions indicate that increasing the im-
portance of medical quality to patients improves
quality competition between hospitals, or the con-
clusions imply that the enhancement of the import-
ance of medical quality to patients will make the
hospital industry more asymmetric based on quality
perspective.
Furthermore, the subsidy effect stimulates quality
improvement of the large hospital, and it also in-
creases that of the small one if and only if the sub-
sidy ratio difference is not too large. But the subsidy
effect on the quality of the small hospital is negative
if the subsidy ratio difference between two hospitals
is large enough. Thus, the government needs to
make an appropriate subsidy ratio difference between
hospitals to improve medical care quality of hospitals
simultaneously. In addition, we find that the subsidy
effect improves the overall quality level of the indus-
try, while it enlarges quality difference and quality
deviation between large and small hospitals. It shows
that the enhancement of subsidy effect improves the
quality level of hospital industry, but it reduces the
level of competition among hospitals at the same
time. Consequently, the subsidy effect is a double-
edged sword.
The conclusions from Proposition 1 to Proposition
3 indicate that subsidy ratio difference between large
and small hospitals impacts the price sensitivity of
the reimbursement ratio. Thus, to achieve an opti-
mal subsidy ratio is quite critical based on the
maximization of social welfare perspective.
Social welfare analyses
In China, hospitals’ medical insurance funds are con-
nected to the quantity of patients. The more patients a
hospital has, the more medical insurance funds it re-
ceives. Therefore, whether the allocation and manage-
ment efficiency of the medical insurance funds are
reasonable is a valuable question to be discussed. We
will try to capture the optimal subsidy ratio based on so-
cial welfare maximization.
Here, we consider social welfare. Social welfare is
defined as the total surplus of the whole society mem-
bers, which equal to patients surplus plus hospitals’
profits and minus reimbursement costs of medical in-
surance. Under Cournot competition, the social wel-
fare is
SW ¼ CS þ πg
þ πs− 1þ uð Þ




In the above function, u represents the manage-
ment efficiency of medical insurance investment
funds. Higher u means lower management efficiency,
and vice verse. Besides, (1 + u)(τgpgxg + τspsxs) are the
total reimbursement costs of medical insurance pro-
vided by the government. We have the first-order







To facilitate the calculation, we order γ ¼ 23 ; β ¼ 52
below.6 Equation (12) has four solutions. However, only
one of them has the realistic value. In other words,






























u2λ2 29053538830008uαλþ 8196753598571λ2−343449602773200u2α2 
q
:
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In order to assure 0 < τg
* < τs
* < 1, we need 0≤α < α and
α cannot be too large.7
We will discuss the social welfare under different sta-
tuses as follows.
If τ = (τg
*, τs
*) the social welfare is:





If τg = 0,τs = 1, the social welfare is
SW 2 ¼
6 297673594α2 þ 297673594αλþ 18465927480uαλþ 43355824005λ2 
1386147361
−




If τg = 1,τs = 1, the social welfare is
SW 3 ¼
12 154877λ2−509124u αþ λð Þ2 
1442401
: ð16Þ
If τg = 0,τs = 0, the social welfare is




Under 0≤α < α, we have SW1 > SW2,SW1 > SW3,SW1 >
SW4 and the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Under the condition of maximizing so-




Remarks: From social welfare perspective, we capture
the optimal medical reimbursement ratio, which de-
pends on the sensitivity of price to the reimbursement
ratio and management efficiency of medical insurance
funds. If policymakers only consider maximizing the pa-
tient surplus, the result must be free medical care. How-
ever, as a developing country with a great population,
the government has a limited ability to bear such huge
medical expenditures. But social welfare maximization is
a suitable target for the policymaker when he tries to
carry out a reasonable medical subsidy policy.
Management efficiency analyses
Here, we will consider the effects of the management ef-
ficiency of medical insurance funds on optimal reim-
bursement ratios. The smaller u is, the higher the
management efficiency of the medical insurance funds






Remarks: The conclusions of Proposition 5 imply that
improvement of the management efficiency of the
medical insurance funds increases optimal medical reim-
bursement ratios of both hospitals, which means effi-
ciency increase enables the government to raise the
subsidy density. If the government does not focus on the
efficiency of the medical insurance funds, patients can-
not maximize their use of the government’s input. The
conclusions of Proposition 5 are very interesting because
they show that management efficiency improvement has
triple advantages: (a) lowering the costs of insurance
management, (b) decreasing the expenditures of patients
and (c) raising the social welfare. That is why the gov-
ernment should sufficiently focus its attention on the
management efficiency of medical insurance funds.
Discussions
Considering the importance of quality and subsidy to
patients in the hospital industry, this paper analyzes both
quality and quantity competition. By employing a three-
stage dynamic game model under Cournot competition,
we argue that the importance of quality to patients has
stronger influence on the small hospital than the larger
one, but on the contrary, subsidy has greater effect on
the large hospital than the small one. Furthermore, the
importance of quality to patients strengthens competi-
tion among hospitals, while subsidy weakens competi-
tion. This paper also shows that reimbursement ratios
difference between the small and the large hospital im-
pacts the relationship between subsidy and competition.
Thus we capture the optimal reimbursement ratio based
on social welfare maximization. Meanwhile, the higher
management efficiency of the medical insurance invest-
ment funds is, the higher the optimal subsidy ratios are.
Under the current subsidy policy, medical quality of
larger hospitals is higher than small ones, but subsidy ra-
tios have little difference. In other words, patients obtain
higher medical quality but little costs difference by
choosing larger hospitals. That is why more and more
patients choose large hospitals as Wang and Chen [26]
issued and that lead to great treatment pressure for lar-
ger hospitals. So it is necessary for the government to
adjust subsidy difference to redistribute patients between
large and small hospitals. By doing that, overload treat-
ment pressure of larger hospitals can be relieved.
Of course, there are also some shortcomings of this
study. First, this paper assumes that the influences of the
importance of quality to patients and subsidy effects for
different hospitals are the same. But in reality, different
size hospitals may have different price increasing abilities
because of difference in reputation. Second, this study
only considers Cournot competition, while other compe-
tition structures such as Stacklberg competition are also
common in fact. Furthermore, we focus our attention on
ratio subsidy, different form China, many countries prac-
tice fixed amount reimbursement policy. So it is valuable
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to take those factors into account in further research
and some other interesting conclusions will be achieved.
Besides, nearly all hospitals have capacity constraints
(limited beds and nurses) and it is important to reveal
what will happen if capacity constraints are taken into
consideration.
Conclusions
Poor medical care level and high fees are the two major
problems in the world health system. This paper states
that subsidy is a two-edged sword. On one hand, subsidy
stimulates medical demands. On the other hand, subsidy
raises price and inhibits hospital competition. Therefore,
the government must carry out appropriate subsidy pol-
icy and a suitable ratios difference between large and
small hospitals to maximize the total social welfare.
More importantly, the government should improve its
funds management efficiency. Health insurance funds
are managed by different departments and have high
operating costs in China. If the management efficiency
of the medical insurance funds is improved, the advan-
tage of reimbursement for patients could be further
enhanced.
In China, almost all residents are covered by the
ongoing basic medical insurance system and the basic
medical insurance system is included by the Medical
Insurance for Urban Workers, the Urban Resident Basic
Medical Insurance and the New Rural Cooperative Medical.
However, different groups are treated with different subsidy.
As part of the ongoing health insurance system reform, the
Chinese central government plans to unify the three
different types of medical insurances under a unitize stand-
ard and to enlarge the reimbursement difference between
different grade of hospitals. Our study shows that as
developing country with limited medical resources and
great differences in hospitals, it is reasonable for the
Chinese government to adjust the reimbursement ra-
tios between different hospitals and to increase medical
quality as two reasonable methods for a sustainable de-
velopment of its health system and a batter distribution
of medical resources.
Endnotes
1Larger hospital and small hospital can also be treated
as larger hospitals group and small hospitals group. So
conclusions of this study are easy to expand to other
market structure.
2This is a reasonable assumption because in China,
most of hospitals are state owned, quite a few are private
hospitals and larger hospitals also mean higher medical
quality.
3Although we employ a duopoly model in this study,
the conclusions are easy to extend to multi-competition
situation.
4Those medical insurance funds are actually reim-
bursements or subsidies from the government to
patients.
5Based on the cost function c xi; qið Þ ¼ 12 xi2 þ qi2ð Þ−xi
qi , we know that β should be larger than 1, otherwise
βxiqi − xiqi < 0 and no hospital is willing to offer a posi-
tive quality. β < β indicates the importance of quality to
patients or price increase ability of the quality should
not be too strong, or the disadvantaged hospital will be
forced to quit the competition.
6Too many parameters lead it is impossible to make
any analyses about the optimal ratios. We only care
about the management efficiency of medical insurance,
we β and γ are given by certain value.
7Different from the standard linear inverse demand
function pi = α − xi − γxj of Cournot, price function in
this study is pi = α + βqi + λτi − xi − γxj, so α should not
too large, or the price will be too high.
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